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What can still be the meaning of philosophy in modernity? 
The core of modernity is “liberty, equality, and fraternity 
through rationality.” The last element, viz. rationality, 
however, implies that modernity is at once a critical 
analysis of its own core. Reason is intrinsically linked to 
critique, even to a critique of modernity’s own basics, 
including its rationality. Therefore, modernity is not 
something ‘substantial’ but rather a process. Nor is it a 
matter of reducing everything to the same – the same of 
reason; but on the contrary, it is a new way of dealing with 
plurality.  This affects also the status of philosophy and its 
relation to the plurality of other independent forms of  
insight, like science, art, religion, etc. Philosophy can no 
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longer provide the ultimate foundation for all the rest (at 
the bottom – Descartes) nor can it be any longer its all-
integrating absolute knowledge (at the top – Hegel).  Lyotard 
describes philosophy as only a small vessel. But that does not 
diminish its central role in today’s modernity. 




hat I will do in this paper is what philosophers are 
supposed to do, and that is to reflect on the different 
concepts involved in the title of this paper: what does 
philosophy mean, what does modernity mean, and what are 
the links between them?  
“Philosophy and Modernity” are concepts we are familiar 
with. Indeed, philosophers are not dealing with odd things, 
things inaccessible to normal people, as is often suggested. 
On the contrary, what philosophers are dealing with is what 
everyone is dealing with. Philosophers are not dealing with 
strange things, but they are asking strange questions about 
normal things. Philosophy is asking questions which always 
lie one step ahead: unusual questions about usual things. 
What does the word ‘modern’ mean? And what actually is 
‘philosophy’? We are supposed to know that, but do we, 
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really? And finally what could be indicated by the word ‘and’ 
in the title, “Philosophy and Modernity”?  
Heidegger says that “it is in the nature of philosophy never 
to make things easier but only more difficult.”2 It makes us 
aware that things are always more complicated than we 
thought at first sight. The philosopher is not the one who 
gives the right answers, but he is someone who brings up the 
right questions so that people can find the answers 
themselves: the real answers are deep in each of us, but we do 
not know them yet. The philosopher, Socrates taught us, is 
like a midwife: he can only help wisdom to get born. Thus, 
the main contribution of philosophy to modern education 
might well be the question mark: philosophy should question 
things that are considered self-evident, not in order to take 
away all answers, but to make these answers richer, more 
complex, more related to the larger whole.  
My aim here is to stay in this tradition of Socrates and his 
pupil Plato. The method of Socrates was “maieutics”: to ask 
questions in order to arrive at deeper insight. These questions 
are questions about concepts. It is no accident that Plato, 
being Socrates’s pupil, worked out a whole theory about the 
world of ideas as the core of his philosophy. It is the core of 
Socrates’ as well, because that is what the questions are always  
all about. They are questions about the good: what the word  
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‘good’ means, or in other words, what the concept of the  
good actually means. We might think, Socrates said, that we 
know that, because we use the word continuously. But when 
you go deeper into it, such words become more and more 
problematic. And that is what philosophers are supposed to 
do: to make clear the complexity of such words and the 
difficulty to understand them properly. That is also what I 
want to do today: to put question marks, especially behind 
the words ‘philosophy’ and ‘modernity.’ And also behind the 
word ‘and’: what does ‘and’ mean here.  
‘Modern’ is also a word we continuously use, but what 
does it mean? What is behind that word? Of course, to a 
certain extent we know it, since we are ‘modern’ people 
ourselves. And yet, what is closest to ourselves, often is the 
darkest of all. That is what Heidegger also says about the 
word ‘Being’: we know it, since we ‘are.’ But when asked to 
explain it, we do not know it at all. To such an extent, 
Heidegger claims, that we even no longer know what we are 
asking about when we are asking about ‘Being.’  
Modernity 
Well to a certain extent, the same is true for the word 
‘modern.’ We all live in modern times, even if these are called 
‘post-modern.’ And we all consider ourselves modern people, 
even if we blame modernity for many problems of today. 
Indeed, even if we blame modernity for many problems, it 
does not stop us from being modern people. Actually, the 




critique of modernity is the essence of modernity itself. And 
that is what makes modernity so special.  
To be ‘modern’ does not mean that one uses technology, 
like a cell-phone or the internet. That is not what makes us 
modern. What defines modernity is far more than that, and 
something quite different. It is in the first place a set of values 
and of ways of thinking. It has to do—as we all know—with 
the rights of the individual, the equality of men and women, 
of freedom of expression and freedom of religion, with 
objectification and the role of science, with the separation of 
church and state, etc. So modernity includes valuations, 
methodologies, principles, which are all bound together in 
some intricate way. In that sense, modernity is like a web. It is 
made up of ways of looking at things, of principles, 
valuations, methodologies, etc., which all hang together in 
some way, like in a web. And when one touches on one of 
these, the whole web starts to wiggle.  
In order to get some grasp of that web, it might be good to 
start from the slogan of the French revolution: liberté, égalité, 
fraternité, with one word added, namely: “Liberty, equality, 
fraternity through rationality.” If one had to summarize what 
modernity is, this would be a good candidate: This would be 
an answer to the question as to what modernity is, in one 
sentence. However, this sentence raises more questions than 
answers—questions which belong to modernity itself. From 
the very beginning, modernity has been this critical reflection 
on what liberty means, or equality, or fraternity for that 




matter. Not counting the word ‘rationality,’ in a way 
modernity has, from its very beginning, been dealing only 
with that word, one could say. In that sense, modernity is first 
of all a reflection on itself: a reflection on what modernity 
itself is or should be, or even ‘could’ be. For that very reason, 
modernity is not ‘something’; it is a process, an ongoing 
process of critical reflection on its own basic elements.  
1. Take for instance the word ‘liberty.’ Whole books are still 
being written on what that could mean. What does 
‘freedom’ mean, after all? The more we reflect on it, the 
less we know it. It has something to do with autonomy 
(from the Greek words ‘autos’ [self] and ‘nomos’ [law]). 
Which means that the law ultimately does not come from 
outside (hetero-nomy) but from ourselves. Even when it is 
said to be heteronomous, i.e. to come from outside (God, 
nature [natural law] etc.), it is the individual who in his full 
autonomy, affirms (or denies) that heteronomy. It always 
is, as Kant said, a self-imposed law, even if it is said to 
come, as Christians do, from God.  
So autonomy means, first of all, the right to decide for 
ourselves our opinion, our moral stance, our marriage, our 
religion, our philosophy, and so on—not on the basis of 
pure arbitrariness, but as Kant would say, on the basis of 
reasonableness. And as we are basically reasonable beings, 
the law comes out of ourselves; it comes out of our own 
reasonableness which is our very being. The law is: be 
yourself, be what you are, be reasonable.  




But autonomy is much broader than that. It does not 
only describe humans who are free or autonomous (e.g. in 
choosing his religion, his moral judgment, his or her 
partner, etc.). No, the autonomy modernity is aiming at is 
far broader. It is related also to the different realms of 
culture. That is where the separation of church and state 
comes in, for instance. Modernity started in philosophy 
with Descartes who said “I think, therefore I am.” That 
implies that I am the principle of my thinking, no longer 
the tradition, or the authorities like in the middle ages, or 
even the bible. Philosophy goes its own way even in 
relation to religion. After all, philosophy is not religion, and 
religion is not philosophy. In science, modernity started 
with Galileo, who based his claims no longer on the bible 
but on experience and measurement: When I measure it 
that way, it is that way. Even if that contradicts the bible. 
The bible does not give you science. “The bible is not 
about how the heavens go, but how to go to heaven,” as 
Cardinal Barronio phrased it. The bible is a religious book, 
not a scientific one. Step by step, all the different domains 
of culture claim their own autonomy: philosophy in 
Descartes, science in Galileo. 
Later, politics becomes autonomous. Modern politics is 
not done on the basis of the bible. We do politics on the 
basis of political principles and reasons. The same goes for 
morals—one of the last domains intimately linked to 
religion, which becomes autonomous. Modern morality is 




done on the basis of moral reasoning, not on the basis of 
religion. So all the different domains become independent 
and develop their own logic: a political logic, a scientific 
one, a philosophical one, etc. This is what Max Weber 
called “the differentiation of culture.” Religion ceases to be 
the all-encompassing domain. Each domain claims its own 
autonomy. 
This is actually very close to what Jean-Francois 
Lyotard, the French postmodern philosopher, calls “the 
end of the great narratives.” What Weber said a hundred 
years ago about the differentiation of culture resonates 
again, more than a century later, in Lyotard. In the 
meantime, philosophy had claimed the all-encompassing 
position (just think of Hegel) taking it over from religion. 
It is philosophy which, not taking a particular position but 
that of ‘reason itself,’ claims to be above all the other 
domains, claiming to encompass and to integrate them all. 
Philosophy, being not limited to a specific form of reason, 
like science, art, religion etc., claimed to be the standpoint 
of reason itself. What becomes clear, at the end of 
modernity, is that reason also cannot take that position 
(the position religion used to occupy). And that is what 
“the end of the great narratives” is all about. I will come 
back to that later. 
2.  The second element is equality, which is also a very 
difficult and complex term. All humans are equal, but of 
course no one is identical to another. All human beings are 




equal, and yet all humans are different. So equality does 
not mean identity. It means ‘of equal value’ (and even that 
is ambiguous). The reformation (Luther, Calvin, etc.) 
stressed that priests are not intrinsically higher than the lay 
person. No calling is intrinsically higher than another. 
Labor and marriage are also a ‘calling.’ In society, equality 
means that no one is intrinsically higher or lower than 
another: no caste, no nobility. One is not more ‘reverend’ 
than another. That step to equality is especially relevant in 
relation to those who are usually excluded, and in that 
sense equality stops exclusion—women, gay people, 
pagans, unbelievers, etc. 
But that equality goes much further. It plays at all levels. 
For instance at the level of the planets: there are no higher 
planets and no lower ones, as in the Middle Ages. When 
Galileo directs his telescope to the moon, he does away 
with the medieval separation between the sub-lunar world 
and supra-lunar world, between earth and heaven. Basically 
there is no intrinsic difference, and certainly no higher and 
lower. 
The same is true for languages, sciences, places, times, 
etc. And eventually (which is more a problem of today) 
also for religions. Religions are not higher or lower in 
themselves; they only are higher or lower in the eyes of the 
believers. And here autonomy comes in again: each of us 
chooses which religion is higher for us, but that is our 




autonomous decision. It does not follow out of ‘the nature 
of things,’ even if it might look that way for the believer.  
That is what is called ‘de-hierarchisation,’ a basic 
principle of modernity: the ‘archai’ [principles] of things 
are no longer ‘hieros’ [sacred]. They are no longer higher 
or lower because God decides it or because it follows from 
‘nature.’ All ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ designations are human 
decisions. This does not mean however that there are no 
longer hierarchies. There are still hierarchies, more than 
ever, but they are ‘autonomously’ put that way. They are 
installed by humans, not by God or nature.  
That does not mean that for the individual there are no 
higher or lower things in themselves. There are higher 
moral norms and lower ones, and one religion is for us 
higher than another, otherwise it would not be our 
religion. But when put this way, it becomes clear how the 
process of de-hierarchisation affects our times more than 
ever. How to decide about higher and lower in morals, in 
religion, in politics, becomes more and more difficult 
because they are always the human being’s (auto-nomous) 
decisions. Even when he or she says that it comes from 
God, it is still a he or a she who says that it comes from 
God. But the other person also has the right to claim that 
his or her vision is higher. That means that there are no 
longer claims of pure absoluteness. We always have to 
‘relativize’ each claim to absoluteness: all absoluteness is 
relative. Reason relates our absoluteness to the claims of 




the other, and in that sense reason relates—and by the 
same token, it relativizes. We have to become, as Marcel 
Gauchet puts it, metaphysically democratic.  
By saying this, I have already introduced the other 
elements in our definition of modernity. In the first place 
the role of reason. But before I come to that, also the 
other element, viz. fraternity must be introduced, since 
what I said about becoming ‘metaphysically democratic’ 
touches first of all upon that third element of modernity, 
viz. fraternity.  
3. The meaning of fraternity is often misunderstood. One 
often hears the complaint that modernity is individualistic 
and that there is not much fraternity. That might be true, 
but that is beside the question. To put it that way is to 
misunderstand the meaning of fraternity. Fraternity has 
nothing to do with love. Rather it is related to those people 
we do not love at all, and even to those we hate. We 
should treat even these people with dignity and respect. So 
fraternity has first of all to do with respect, and respect 
goes beyond tolerance. Tolerance means to tolerate, but to 
respect means more: you have to recognize the value of 
other cultures, of other religions, of other traditions, etc. 
Fraternity is actually referring to the whole sphere of 
justice, and justice has to do first of all with a ‘just’ 
treatment backed by a whole juridical system. Justice 
means respecting the basic rights of others because they 
too (other cultures, other religions) have value in 
themselves.  




That respect (or justice) is expressed in different ways. It 
is first expressed in the word ‘recognition’—another 
central word today. This recognition is not based on 
someone’s hierarchical place, but on his or her having 
value and on his or her being ‘equal’ to you. As such, 
fraternity is based on equality: the equality of each person, 
each culture, each religion, etc. 
The respect for that equality is expressed, secondly, in 
the rule of law which guarantees a minimum of recognition 
to all, independent from the will of the king, of the 
majority of people, or whatever. And thirdly, this respect is 
expressed in the obligatory mutual support: i.e. in the 
welfare state, in Obama care, in social security systems to 
which everyone has to contribute. Fraternity is not on the 
level of the will but on the level of obligation. It is one’s 
duty to pay taxes, or respect another religion. 
And finally, that respect or that justice must be done to 
the other, is expressed and summarized in the universality 
of human rights. Fraternity has to do first of all with the 
rights of the other and the obligation to respect them, even 
if you do not like that other at all. In that sense these 
human rights are said to be basic in modernity, because 
they encompass all the basic elements, not only for 
ourselves, but as much for the other (in that sense they are 
not only rights, but also obligations). They encompass the 
autonomy of both me and the other, our equality, and our 
being a ‘frater’ (a brother). In that sense, human rights 




refer not only to me (for whom they are rights) but also to 
the other (for whom they are rights as well, and thus for 
me obligations to respect).  
For modernity, these human rights function in a double 
way. They function as something which can be enforced, 
but at the same time for a modern society they function as 
an appeal, as an ideal. In other words, they function in a 
modern society both as the minimum (the minimum of 
rights) and as the maximum: the full deployment of men 
and women in society. But here again, these human rights 
are extremely important but at the same time they contain 
as many problems as they contain answers: what does the 
freedom of expression, or the freedom of religion mean? 
How far do they go? How do we harmonize them? When 
you think of Charlie Hebdo and the cartoons against 
Mohammed: where does the freedom of expression end 
and where does the freedom of religion begin? Here again 
we see how modernity is a very complex phenomenon. 
The principles seem to be clear, but they are a nest of 
confusion. The fact that the Supreme Courts, in the US, in 
Europe, in the Philippines, and everywhere have so much 
work to do, is the symptom of that.  
4.  The fourth, and most difficult, element to define when it 
comes to modernity is rationality. We continuously use 
that word (certainly philosophers do) but we know less 
than ever what it means. Why do we call certain things 
or positions ‘reasonable’? Is it because we can deduce 




them? Most of the things we call reasonable are not 
deducible. This process of deduction is different from 
the question of from what they would be deducible. For 
instance the separation of church and state, or of politics 
and religion: how would you be able to come to an 
answer to that just by a logical deduction?  
Religion and politics were always intertwined, from the 
very beginning of mankind, up to today (just look to the 
Tea Party in the US, or to the Philippines for that matter). 
Or take the equality of men and women as it is 
understood in modernity: even in modernity up till now, 
this equally was not evident at all and not logically 
deducible.  
Women’s rights are a very recent topic all over the 
globe. So many things we take for granted as reasonable 
today were not so evident in the past, even for the 
greatest minds. Plato for instance had slaves and saw no 
problem in it, just like Socrates. Even Saint Paul did not 
advocate the abolition of slavery. So it is not a matter of 
pure logic nor is it a matter of thinking better than before. 
It is a matter of thinking differently. And that means that 
it is a matter of ‘reason’ in a very complicated way. 
It is a matter not of common sense either, as people 
often say.3 What used to be common-sense can change 
 
3 Descartes said already that common sense is a tricky thing: there is one thing 
he said which is evenly or justly distributed, that is common sense: everyone is of 
the opinion that he has enough of it. The others don’t, but I have common sense.  




over the years, and can become quite wrong, as the 
mistaken common-sense of having slaves for over the 
centuries testifies. Or maybe we should put it differently: 
what we call common sense is often what we have come to 
see as reasonable throughout the ages. And when that 
‘reasonableness’ changes, also common sense changes.  
Yet, reason is at the heart of modernity: reason is the 
core of reality (“things are reasonably together”) as well as 
the key to reality. When a new unknown disease comes up, 
there is only one way to deal with it for modern people, 
and that is through rationality and scientific research. 
Reason is the last criterion, even in relation to religions: we 
no longer accept religions which are against all reason.  
In that sense reason is related to what Max Weber called 
“the disenchantment of the world,” which literally means 
that there are no longer magic influences, not by man on 
God (man cannot influence the deities by magic rites or 
formulas) nor by God on man: everything happens the 
way it does not by arbitrary decrees of the deities but by 
‘reasonable’ laws—eventually fully accessible only to 
reason.  
Thereby the world becomes autonomous and 
isomorphic; there are no two levels of causation, a natural 
one and a supernatural one. Eventually disenchantment is 
the end of a two worlds concept, with a physical world on 
the one hand, and a supernatural on the other. 
Disenchantment means that there is only one world, our 




world. Does that mean that only the world of science is 
left? Is that the only ‘reasonable’ world? Or is there only 
the philosophical world? Is philosophical reason in the end 
the only valid reason? I will come to that later, but for now 
I have been stressing that reason is more than logical 
deduction. What we find reasonable, we do not find 
because we have been able to ‘prove’ it. In this regard it 
might be relevant to make a distinction between reason 
and rationality, where rationality could refer more to logical 
deduction, while ‘reasonableness’ is broader: it is the ability 
to ‘reason’—taken here as a verb in the first place. This 
entails a willingness and the ability to give reasons and thus 
to argue. It is that kind of reasonableness that is required 
for instance in a modern democratic process of decision-
making. Or in morals, for that matter. But I will go deeper 
into rationality later on. First I will move to a next step.  
Enlightenment and Romanticism 
Although the basics of modernity seem to be clear 
(“liberty, equality, fraternity through rationality”), they contain 
as much problems as answers, such as how to give content to 
liberty (autonomy), equality (equality in what regard?), 
fraternity (what is justice? ), and certainly also to reason.  
We often equate modernity with enlightenment, but 
enlightenment is only one way of giving content to these 
ideals of modernity, even if it is the first way. In the 
beginning, modernity and enlightenment were the same (as in 
Descartes, Spinoza, etc.). But slowly, the reaction started, 




culminating in what we now call Romanticism. The Romantic 
reaction is not a reaction against modernity but against 
enlightenment and the enlightenment concepts of liberty, 
equality, fraternity, and rationality. In the romantic reaction 
(which officially started around 1790 and already influenced 
Kant and Hegel, but actually had its roots already much 
earlier), all of these elements get a completely new twist.  
Take first of all liberty or autonomy. In the enlightenment 
version it is first of all the individual freedom that matters, 
independent of others—of culture, of tradition, and even of 
the world outside. Think for instance of Descartes: his 
subject is a subject which in principle could exist completely 
on its own. But such a subject is a construction. The 
romantics will stress that we are only what and who we are in 
relation: in relation to others, to our traditions, our language, 
our culture. Each subject is an embedded subject, not an 
atomic one.  
The same goes for equality. In the enlightenment view 
man is first of all an individual rational subject and it is only 
as such that we are all equal. To a large extent, we are even 
identical: as Kant presupposes we all have the same rational 
apparatus. But romanticism will stress that we are first of all 
radically different, not only as individual beings, but also as 
embedded beings. First of all, romanticism will come up with 
the idea of authenticity. We are all individual selves, different 
from others, with each of us our own individual depth. And 
that difference has to do with our specific embeddedness. We 
have all different cultures, different languages, different 




religions, and different ways of thinking. I am not just a 
rational subject and as such equal to you. I have a different 
soul and a different identity. I am also what I am born with, 
what I believe, what I feel and fear. The rising nationalism of 
today is one of the outcomes of these insights.  
This also has immediate consequences on the concept of 
fraternity. Where fraternity means respect and recognition of 
each one’s identity, the question today is what this identity 
consists in. From the romantic point of view it is not only a 
matter of recognizing identity, but first of all a recognition of 
difference. You can think here of the hot discussions on the 
headscarf. From the enlightenment perspective this is 
something particular and does not deserve recognition. From 
the romantic perspective, it is part of my identity (identity-
through-difference) and needs recognition. Here one sees 
very clearly that what is important are not only liberty, 
equality, fraternity, and rationality, but also and even more 
how these are conceived.  
Actually, romanticism was a reaction to the unilateral 
understanding of these concepts, stressing the need to 
broaden them. Instead of the disembedded subject and the 
disengaged subject of enlightenment (with the scientist as 
model), romanticism stresses embeddedness and engagement. 
Where enlightenment separates facts and values, romanticism 
stresses their connectedness—just like it stresses the 
connectedness of reason and emotion, of philosophy and 
literature, of our thinking and our cultural background, and so 
on. That is one of the reasons I made a distinction earlier 




between rationality and reasonableness. Rationality would fit 
better with the enlightenment, while reasonableness fits better 
with the romantic critique.  
Philosophy and Modernity 
Behind this distinction between enlightenment and 
romanticism is a wholly different concept of being human, 
and a wholly different concept of reality.  
Philosophy cannot simply provide the ‘right’ concept of 
man or the right concept of the world or the right morals: 
these actually do not exist as such. And even if they would, 
we do not have them. In the garden of Eden, man was 
forbidden to eat from only one tree: the tree of knowledge, 
knowledge first of all of good and evil. That knowledge we 
will never have. It will remain a lifelong search, forever. But 
what we do have in philosophy is critical analysis. Philosophy 
lives from critique, radical critique: not in the negative sense 
of rejection, but in the original sense of the Greek word 
krinein: to judge, to assess, to weigh and to balance, and see 
what it is worth—through reasonable argument.  
But at the same time, philosophy is also looking in depth. 
We try to capture, judge, and assess our different 
presuppositions in the depth of our differences. Those 
differences include those which we are conscious of, but 
above all those of which we are less conscious but which 
come into play in our consciousness nevertheless. I do think 
that the task of philosophy is also, and maybe even in the first 
place, a search for presuppositions. We search for not only 




our individual or cultural presuppositions, but also what we 
have in the back of our mind when we talk about modernity. 
What kind of modernity do we presuppose, what kind of 
humans? What is our concept of subjectivity or of the world? 
These are today the basic issues that determine our discourse. 
In that sense, philosophy is at the heart of the question of 
what modernity is.  
Philosophy certainly has changed over the centuries, not 
only in relation to the Middle Ages by gaining its autonomy, 
but also within modernity. The distinction between religion 
and philosophy certainly has become deeper in modernity 
than in the Middle Ages due to the differentiation Weber was 
talking about. I have the impression that for Filipino students 
going to Europe, this distinction is one of the most radical 
experiences. The distinction is far greater in Western Europe 
than it is in the Philippines, and it is still a lot greater in some 
of the great universities in the United States of America. 
But even in an autonomous ‘modern’ philosophy, the role 
of reason is not univocal. Modernity is not a monolithic 
thing. It is not a substance, a thing, but an ongoing process. 
Until today, it is a process of reflection and self-reflection. 
Indeed, modernity is based on rationality, but rationality or 
better, reasonableness, is a complex thing. This on-going 
process of reasonableness has a very special status compared 
for instance to emotion, or revelation, or tradition, or 
intuition. Emotion cannot put limits to itself, nor can 
revelation. Only reason can see the limits of emotion and of 
revelation or intuition and see that the latter do not 




encompass everything. In addition, reason can also put limits 
to itself: to think reasonably implies to think reasonably about 
reason itself: what it means, what its limitations are, and its 
possibilities. Reason is the only faculty which not only can 
critically analyze the other faculties and limit them, but also 
critically analyze and put limits to itself. What is so special 
about modernity is this process of critique, and above all, self-
critique: the continuous reflection on reason by reason itself. 
That is actually what happened in romanticism. In the end, it 
was a reflection on reason. And that happened throughout 
modernity, until today. Post-modernism, for instance, is such 
a critique of reason by reason itself—and actually the whole 
of contemporary philosophy, from Kierkegaard to Heidegger, 
and from Wittgenstein to Rawls.  
All this means that modernity as it is now, is no longer the 
same as enlightenment. The meaning of reasonableness today 
is enlightenment gone through that romantic reaction (and 
many other reactions) and thereby qualified. Modernity is no 
longer what it was at the time of Descartes or Hume, or even 
of Kant and Hegel for that matter. Centuries of reflection 
have come after, and they all qualified what modernity means 
today, in our so-called ‘postmodern’ or late-modern times.  
And thus it also qualified philosophy. It can no longer 
mean what it meant for Descartes: the absolute foundation 
(fundamentum inconcussum). This has shown to be an impossible 
dream: the dream to replace the absolute certainty of religion 
by the absolute certainty of reason. Reason does not provide 
us an absolute foundation. Hegel tried to save the absolute 




position of reason by putting reason not underneath but 
above everything, as the all-encompassing ‘absolute spirit.’ 
But even that showed itself to be impossible. Philosophy 
cannot encompass it all: science, religion, art, etc. They go 
their own way, and philosophy is left apparently as just one 
domain among all the others. We have to recognize that, 
more than ever, there are many approaches to reality, not just 
the philosophical one, and that the philosophical one no 
longer has a kind of a privileged position, as it had in 
Descartes or in Kant or Hegel. Yet, philosophy still has some 
special position. It has its own way of dealing with plurality.  
Actually, modernity is first of all the recognition of 
plurality and the search for a means to deal with that: a 
plurality of autonomous approaches to reality, like science, 
religion, philosophy, art, opinions, traditions, languages, etc. 
Modernity started with plurality and it ends with it. It started 
when the unity of a Christian culture was torn apart during 
the religious wars in Europe. That was the time that 
modernity started. It tried to develop an answer religion no 
longer could give: how to deal with that plurality. At the end 
of modernity, in our late-modern times, plurality is the word 
of the day. Modernity is an attempt to develop a way to deal 
with plurality through the way of reason, the way of critical 
analysis and of reasonable discourse. In the meantime we are 
far from the answers given at the beginning of modernity by 
Descartes and others. 
What we have learned, philosophers and religious people 
alike, but also scientists and artists, is that there are two 




positions which we cannot occupy: we do not have the 
absolute standpoint nor do we have no standpoint at all. We 
always have one particular standpoint, including the 
philosopher.  
For the same reason science is not the absolute standpoint 
either, nor is it a standpointless standpoint. Even science 
looks through specific glasses, from a certain perspective, 
using a specific method, asking specific questions and looking 
for well-defined kinds of answers. No matter how important 
science might be, it is a human enterprise, tentative, bound to 
historic conditions and concepts, and looking from a certain 
perspective—a perspective we can no longer escape, it is true, 
but a specific perspective nevertheless. This also means that it 
cannot be taken to be the only and final narrative about 
humans and the world.  
But this is true for all other domains as well, not only for 
science. It is true also for art, and even for religion. It is often 
said that science reduces things, and that is true. Indeed, 
science reduces, but that is not only its weakness, it is also its 
strength. By looking from a very specific standpoint, asking 
very specific questions, and looking for very well-defined 
kinds of answers (measurable ones for instance), it can see 
what otherwise cannot be seen. It always has certain glasses 
on. This is true also for all the other domains, including 
religion. They all look through certain lenses as well. They all 
build on experience, just like science. But at the same time, 
they also create their own experience and that is exactly what 
glasses do: they make us see things we otherwise cannot see.  




That is why within modernity, and even within an 
enchanted world, there can and should still be room for 
enchantment. However, in order to see it, one does need a 
specific kind of glasses and a specific language: the language 
of narratives, holy texts and symbols, the language of rites 
and traditions. They too tell us something about humans and 
the world and even about our disenchanted world. Only with 
glasses fathoming the depth in things can one see depth, as 
the American philosopher Alfred North Whitehead says, “a 
one-eyed reason is deficient in the vision of depth.” With one 
eye you hardly see depth. That is why even in modernity there 
can perfectly be and should be room for something like 
religion, just like for art or poetry for that matter. Science tries 
to see less in things (all are merely cells and atoms), religion 
tries to see more in them (something divine). And each of 
these perspectives reveals their own truth about what it 
means to be human and about the meaning of the world.  
Modernity is thus not simply the leveling down of 
everything or the great narrative of Reason, with a capital R, 
dominating all other narratives as is sometimes suggested. 
This certainly is not the modernity we are living in today. 
Modernity as it has evolved throughout the centuries, 
continuously reflecting on itself, is not leading to an 
overpowering unity but is rather a (new) way of dealing with 
the always-growing plurality, a plurality that is more radical 
than ever.  
We cannot deny plurality throughout history, but that 
plurality was not as radical as it is now. Reality was looked at 




from one perspective, our own, and what did not fit in it, was 
wrong, inferior, etc. That has been so throughout history, for 
religions, for traditions and cultures, etc. But now, in the time 
of modernity, with its liberty, equality and fraternity, this can 
no longer be the position: we have to recognize the value of 
other religions, other cultures, other opinions, etc. In that 
sense, modernity is far more demanding than any other 
culture: our perspective is only one perspective and a 
particular one. It can no longer be the only access to reality. 
That is what is meant by radical plurality. And then the 
question is: how do we deal with that? How do we deal with 
otherness, without either rejecting it or reducing it to the 
same?  
We cannot reduce everything to its reasonable core. That is 
not a recognition of plurality. It is first to let things (or 
religions, cultures, or whatever) reveal themselves, in their 
entirety. Yet, as a philosopher we approach it through reason: 
a hermeneutical reason nowadays, in search not of foundation 
but of understanding, in search of the meaning and the webs 
of meaning expressed in it. Yet, in the end reason remains the 
last judge: what goes against all reason is unacceptable. That 
remains. In that sense modernity is turning the mediaeval 
principle about the relation between religion and philosophy 
upside down: for the Middle Ages—as for Aquinas for 
instance—reason should be able to go its own way, except 
that it cannot contradict the bible. Now it is the opposite: 
religions can go their own way, except that they cannot 
contradict reason.  




The final place of reason is and remains at the heart of 
modernity. Reason is also at the heart of philosophy. For that 
very reason, philosophy is pivotal for modernity. Not that 
philosophy can take the position of ‘reason itself’ as we have 
seen. Reason, and the role of philosophy for that matter, can 
no longer be what people like Descartes or Hegel conceived it 
to be. Step by step, reason has learned that it is not everything 
and that it cannot do everything. Not everything comes out 
of reason. To the contrary, not very much comes out of 
reason. The real answers are given elsewhere. Yet reason 
remains the last criterion to judge and assess (krinein) all the 
other narratives, even if first of all negatively: what is really 
unreasonable cannot be accepted. In other words, reason is 
not the only word, but it does have the final word.  
That is true also today. More than ever are we confronted 
with questions such as: how shall we deal with both science 
and religion for instance, or with reason and emotion or 
intuition, how do we deal with a multitude of perspectives, 
standpoints, and registers. That was the primordial question 
of modernity from the very beginning and it still is. Modern 
politics is characterized since Montesquieu by the division of 
power: legislative power, executive power, juridical power. 
“Power should limit power” as Montesquieu said. In a 
modern democracy, the law should limit the politician. 
Something similar is true for all modern ways of thinking and 
for all modern ways of dealing with different forms of truth: 
‘truth should limit truth.’  




What then about philosophy? What is its place in all that, if 
it can no longer be the foundation or the integration of all, as 
in Descartes or Hegel? Is it just a domain alongside the other 
ones? Yes and no. Philosophy is, as Jean-Francois Lyotard the 
French postmodern philosopher says, not even a domain in 
itself. But it does have a very special status. Lyotard compares 
our culture to an archipelago of different islands (you can 
think of the Philippines if you want), islands like science, art, 
religion, etc. Philosophy, Lyotard says, is not an island in 
itself. It does not occupy a specific domain nor does it have a 
specific method. But that exactly makes it so specific. 
Philosophy is like a small vessel, he says, sailing from one 
island to the other. The philosopher is at home nowhere, and 
yet everywhere, over the whole ocean. He goes ashore at all 
the islands but can leave them as well, showing how each 
island is but an island.  
In that sense, philosophy guards us against two things: it 
guards us against both narrow-mindedness and arrogance. It 
safeguards from the narrow-mindedness of locking oneself 
up in one’s own limited domain and of looking only through 
one’s own limited glasses. It keeps thought directed towards 
the whole and open for what is behind, beyond, or aside. On 
the other hand, philosophy guards against all claims to 
absoluteness, whether they come from religion, science, art, 
or economy, from one’s own culture or from another one. To 
philosophize, Gadamer seems to have said once, is to realize 
that the other might also be right.  




Why do we think the way we think today? And why do 
other people, other cultures, other philosophies, or other 
religions think differently? This is not because we can think 
better. In all cultures, there are clever people, not only in our 
own. We do not think better, we think differently—based on 
other presuppositions, coming from different backgrounds. 
To do philosophy is to try to become aware, again and again, 
of our presuppositions and thus of the glasses through which 
we are looking. No one can claim to have no perspective and 
to have no glasses on. Without glasses (i.e. without 
presuppositions) one cannot see, as Gadamer has made clear, 
or Popper for that matter when it comes to science. 
According to Popper, “Our intellect does not draw its laws 
from nature, but tries—with varying degrees of success—to 
impose upon nature laws which it freely invents.”4 It is our 
questions which make nature speak. But they also determine 
what nature can answer and how it can answer. Without 
glasses one cannot see, and without presuppositions one 
cannot think, since consciousness exactly means to select and 
to organize. But once we are aware of the fact that we are 
wearing glasses, we are already to some extent transcending  
them. It certainly is the first step to wisdom—something 
philosophy, according to its very name, is looking after.5 
 
4 Karl Popper, Conjectures and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 
(London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, l996), p. 191. [-Ed.] 
5 Although it is important to keep in mind that philosophy is looking for a 
certain kind of wisdom: wisdom-through-reason. It is not the wisdom of the guru, 
nor that of the old wise man, nor that of the priest or the monk for that matter. It 
is not that kind of wisdom philosophy is after: it is only after that wisdom which 
 




To do philosophy is not just to try to know or to 
memorize what all these strange philosophers have been 
claiming over the centuries. The first thing is to know why 
they proclaim these often strange things: from what 
perspective, from what way of questioning, or from what kind  
of problematic. And above all: with what arguments? Then it 
will soon become clear that these strange claims are far less 
strange than they appeared at first sight. Soon our 
spontaneous criticism will lose their pertinence. Not that we 
have the right answers all of a sudden. Philosophy does not 
offer many answers, but mainly questions. And each answer 
is questioned again right away. But in the meantime, insight 
grows. Even when philosophy does not give answers, it yields 
insight. Through philosophy, one starts to see the complexity 
of things, their different aspects and the different possible 
approaches to them. Philosophy, to repeat Heidegger, is not 
there to make things easy, it is there to make things difficult. 
It makes us look in the plural and see the complexity. And 
that is what philosophy is all about. It is the beginning of the 
kind of wisdom philosophy is looking for.  
 
 
can be based on reasonable argument. Where reason ends, philosophy ends. Of 
course one can claim that there is more than reason, but even for that reasons have 
to be provided in order for this to be a philosophical statement.  
